This paper proposes a formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning based on prioritized argumentation. We argue that nonmonotonic reasoning in general can be viewed as selecting monotonic inferences by a simple notion of priority among inference rules. More importantly, these types of constrained inferences can be speci ed in a knowledge representation language where a theory consists of a collection of rules of rst order formulas and a priority among these rules. We recast default reasoning as a form of prioritized argumentation, and illustrate how the parameterized formulation of priority may be used to allow various extensions and modi cations to default reasoning. We also show that it is possible, but more di cult, to express prioritized argumentation by default logic: even some particular forms of prioritized argumentation cannot be represented modularly by defaults under the same language.
Introduction
In the past nonmonotonic reasoning has mainly been studied in formalisms where default assumptions constitute a necessary component, e.g., defaults in default logic 41], negationas-failure in logic programming 10], disbeliefs in various nonmonotonic modal logics 34] , and hypotheses in Theorist and abducibles in some abductive and argumentation frameworks 5, 14, 15, 26, 37] .
In classic logic, reasoning is based on monotonic inferences. Such a sequence of inferences can be viewed as an argument that supports one's assertion. The notion of constrained monotonic inferences is about selecting some of these monotonic inferences according to a speci ed constraint. As an example, consider the bird-y example: Birds normally y unless it can be shown otherwise. Suppose we know that dead birds don't y, neither do hungry birds. The problem can be represented by the following inference rules (for simplicity, we remove the condition bird):
1: fly 2: :fly dead bird 3: :fly hungry bird with priority 1 2 and 1 3, meaning when either 2 or 3 is applied the application of 1 should be blocked. Now, assume we know that the bird is dead: 4: dead bird
Consider the two monotonic derivations, I 1 = f1g which concludes fly, and I 2 = f4;2g which concludes :fly. The speci ed priority selects I 2 , because rule 2 being applicable blocks the application of rule 1. Schematically, one can use a general rule to express \unless it can be shown otherwise":
5: :fly :fly with priority 1 5. Now speci c reasons for not ying need not be related to 1, i.e. the priorities like 1 2 and 1 3 are no longer needed. The idea of constrained inferences suggests a general formalism for knowledge representation and reasoning, which we call priority logic, where a theory (or a program) consists of a collection of inference rules and a priority among these rules. In priority logic, reasoning is based on derivations using these inference rules. A priority is a collection of constraints of the form l i l j where l i and l j are inference rules. These constraints play the role of selecting those rst order derivations that satisfy them. For this reason, a priority is also called a priority constraint in this paper. A rule is applicable if its premises are already derived. A sequence of applicable rules then forms what we call an argument, such as I 1 and I 2 above. The fully extended arguments that satisfy the speci ed priority are then regarded as representing the \semantics" of a theory, since they describe what follows from the theory in terms of the consequences of these arguments by the classic derivability and entailment relation.
Priority logic may o er a number of advantages over the conventional formalisms relying on default assumptions. First, a speci cation in this language is free from potential complications arising from the use of default constructs; e.g., the need of abnormality predicates as in circumscription; whether to use normal or semi-normal defaults in knowledge representation using default logic; and in logic programming, the confusion between default and explicit negation.
Second, in this formalism one can directly specify that some evidence is stronger than another. The need for such a construct was rst suggested by Ginsberg 20] . For example, the transformer is far more likely to fail than is the power supply; the evidence that Quakers are paci sts is stronger than the evidence that Republicans are not. This feature seems particularly important in legal reasoning, since it is generally assumed that legal norms are generally incoherent and con icting because they can be issued by di erent authorities at di erent times to reach incompatible socio-political objectives (cf. 28, 39] ). The coordination of con icting pro les of legal relevance is often accomplished by establishing preference relations among assertions: one norm prevails over others, some arguments are stronger than others. We note that problems of this kind traditionally fall into the area of belief revision.
Furthermore, knowledge representation with a language construct of priority in many cases can resolve the multiple extension problem in default reasoning. This line of research was rst carried out by Reiter and Criscuolo 42] , where they embed a defeasibility relation into defaults by modifying their justi cations. The formalism proposed in this paper allows one to specify such a defeasibility relation directly.
We argue that nonmonotonic reasoning in general can be viewed as prioritized argumentation. In this paper we choose to study the relationship between prioritized argumentation and default reasoning (in the sense of Reiter 41] ), as Reiter's default logic is perhaps the most extensively studied nonmonotonic reasoning formalism, and its relationships with other formalisms have often been investigated deeply (cf. 18, 23, 32] ). Thus the technical ideas in establishing the main results of this paper could be useful in studying how prioritized argumentation is related to other forms of nonmonotonic reasoning.
We rst show that defaults can be expressed adequately by priority among rules. This is achieved by a tractable and semantics preserving transformation from default theories to priority logic programs. The problem of representing priority logic programs by default theories is more subtle. As we will see later in this paper, priority logic formulated here is in fact a parameterized logic, which allows priority to be interpreted di erently by using di erent extensibility functions, resulting in possibly di erent semantics. Informally, an extensibility function speci es how a partial argument (a derivation sequence) could be extended by a set of rules and a priority among them. Since one can argue that default theories can also be given a variety of semantics, any reasonable approach to the problem should be based on a particular semantics. We show that any (propositional) priority logic program, under a speci c extensibility function, can be translated to a default theory. However, we also show that if restricted to the same language (i.e. no additional symbols outside the language are allowed), no modular translation, in the sense of Gottlob 21] , exists. Considering that the translation from default logic to priority logic is modular and within the same language, this seems to suggest that priority logic is at a level more basic than default logic.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce priority logic { its syntax and semantics. In Section 3 we show how default logic can be captured by priority logic. Section 4 shows that priority logic programs under a speci c semantics can be transformed to default theories, and contains the result that no modular translation exists if restricted to the same language. Section 5 is about related work, and Section 6 contains nal remarks and comments on the proof theory of priority logic.
This paper is revised and extended from a workshop paper that appeared as 52]. In particular, the results given in Sections 2.3 and 4 are new. In 52] it is also shown how defeasible (inheritance) networks can be expressed in priority logic. The transformation presented there is intractable. The problem of representing defeasible networks by priority logic has since become unnecessary in light of our recent result that defeasible networks can be translated tractably to normal logic programs 53], and of the result given in this paper that default logic (of which normal programs under the stable model semantics are a special case) can be represented by priority logic. The theme of this paper, namely that nonmonotonic reasoning in general can be viewed as selecting monotonic inferences compatible with a priority constraint, has been argued for elsewhere by the authors. In 50], it is shown that the circumscription of existential quanti er-free formulas can be captured by priority logic, and in 54] it is shown that disjunctive logic programming based on stable models is in fact a form of prioritized argumentation in the sense of this paper.
Priority Logic
In this section we describe the language of priority logic and provide a formal, mathematical model of argumentation based on extensibility of arguments. We then show that this model possesses an intuitive interpretation of argumentation in terms of attacks and counterattacks of arguments in the sense of 5, 14, 15].
Language
Suppose L is a rst order language with equality = and standard connectives :;_;^; ; , and quanti ers 9;8. The formulas of L are de ned as usual. They are denoted by ; ; , possibly with a subscript.
An inference scheme is of the form 1 ; :::; m where m 0, and i 's and are formulas of L. When m = 0, we may simply write .
Each inference scheme represents a set of inference rules, where the free variables in the scheme have been instantiated by terms from the underlying domain (for example, the Herbrand domain of the language L). Thus these free variables are in fact metavariables for ground terms. Generally we use a label with variables to name a rule scheme. The variables in a label are the free variables appearing in the scheme. For example, we use l(x; y) to label the rule scheme q(x) p(x; y). Like a scheme, a label with variables represents all the instantiated labels. In the rest of the paper, we assume that inference schemes and priorities are already instantiated so we only deal with inference rules and ground priorities. Note that bound variables are allowed in rules, just as they are in more standard argumentation frameworks (see, e.g. 15]). 2 A priority theory (also called a priority logic program or simply a priority program) is a pair hR; i where R is a set of inference schemes and , called a priority or priority constraint, is an arbitrary binary relation on R. Intuitively, r 1 r 2 means that if r 2 is applicable (i.e. its premises are already derived), r 1 's application should be blocked. Note that in priority logic we place no restriction on a priority: it is an arbitrary binary relation among rules. Given an inference rule r = 1 ; :::; m , we use Pre(r) to refer to f 1 ; :::; m g and Cons(r) to . Intuitively, a priority constrains whether a rule can be applied or not: if l l 0 and l 0 is applied, the inference rule l should be suspended.
Given the standard entailment relation j =, we de ne the closure of a set S of formulas as Th(S) = fC : S j = Cg. Suppose P is a set of inference rules and S a set of formulas. The familiar consequence operator T P is de ned as T P (S) = fCons(r) : r 2 P; S j = Pre(r)g Since T P is a monotonic function over the domain of subsets of rules, it has a unique least xpoint. As usual, this least xpoint is denoted by T "! P . S is contradictory if T "! S j =?;
otherwise it is said to be consistent. The set of applicable rules in a rule set P, denoted App(P), is de ned as App(P) = fr 2 P : T "! P j = Pre(r)g.
Arguments as semantics
A primary interest in a priority logic program lies in what can be derived by using which inference rules. A derivation is just a chain of reasoning using inference rules. At a level of conceptualization, such a derivation can be understood as an argument that supports one's conclusions.
De nition 2.1 (argument on hR; i) Let hR; i be a priority logic program. An argument I is a ( nite or in nite) set of inference rules in R such that I's rules can be arranged into a sequence, say S I = fw 1 ; :::; w n ; :::g, such that for every w i 2 S I , i 1, we have T "! fw 1 ;:::;w i?1 g j = Pre(w i ). 2
That is, an argument is just a sequence of rules, each of which is applicable by the rules prior to it. The set notation used here is for convenience in talking about composing arguments, sub-argument relationship, membership, etc. This notation also removes the need to treat the rearrangements of a sequence of rules as di erent arguments.
We use arguments as a basis for semantics. Note that the logic connectives in our language L are all classic. In particular, : is classic negation and _ classic disjunction.
Non-classic connectives may be representable in priority logic, a topic outside the cope of this paper (but see 54] for how epistemic disjunction can be represented by priority in the sense of this paper).
Given a priority logic program hR; i, we are interested in those arguments that agree with the speci ed constraint . The construction of such an argument involves how to extend an argument I by possibly admitting more rules into it. Since when we specify r r 0 , we mean that the applicability of r 0 blocks that of r, a natural notion of extending an argument I is as follows: I admits a rule r ( One of the major di erences between the notion of priority studied in this paper and others in the literature is that in our case a priority is an arbitrary binary relation while in others a partial order is imposed. The question arises as what if we have a cyclic chaining of priorities such as r r 0 and r 0 r. A natural interpretation in this case is that r and r 0 have the same strength in being applied but, apparently, they should not coexist in any fully extended argument. For example, suppose we have a priority program = hf1: a ; 2: b g;f1 2; 2 1gi. Under the notion of extensibility discussed above, we should have two fully extended arguments f1g and f2g. That is, in each case the rule in the set remains in as it is not blocked by any rule in the set, and the rule outside the set remains out as it is blocked by a rule in the set. This gives us two stable arguments.
We should note that cyclic chainings of the above form di er from ill-speci ed priorities such as r r. The presence of such a priority could make no argument I stable. If r is in I then it should be out since it is blocked by a rule (itself) in I; and if r is not in I then it should be in (assuming there is no other applicable rule r 0 such that r r`) since it is not blocked by any rule in I.
In the rest of this section we discuss and de ne semantics of prioritized argumentation. Priority logic is a parameterized system which allows possibly di erent interpretations of priority. The semantics of a priority logic program depends on how an argument may be extended. This is achieved by a parameter R, which is a mapping over arguments. We call such a mapping an extensibility function. We now de ne the most intuitive extensibility function discussed above.
De nition 2.2 Let = hR; i be a priority logic program and I an argument. We de ne an extensibility function R s as R s (I) = App(fr 2 R : 8r 0 2 I; r 6 r 0 g). 2
Note that, since each rule in an argument must be applicable in the argument itself, the employment of App is technical and ensures that the resulting set of rules is an argument. Since there will be no confusion about which program is being used, in the sequel we will omit and simply write R s .
The approach based on possibly di erent extensibility functions is exible enough to allow various extensions and modi cations to prioritized argumentation. To illustrate this point, here we discuss some additional examples of extensibility functions.
As the rst example, we can strengthen the notion of extensibility by insisting on consistent extensions; i.e. given an argument I and rule r, r extends I if there is no r 0 2 I such that r r 0 and if I implies the precondition of r then r's conclusion must not contradict I. More formally, De nition 2.3 Let hR; i be a priority logic program and I an argument. We de ne an extensibility function R c as R c (I) = App(fr 2 R : 8r 0 2 I; r 6 r 0 and T "! I 6 j = :Cons(r)g).
2
As expected, the extensibility function R c could be used to avoid the global e ect of inconsistency. For example, with = hf1: a ; 2: :a g;;i, there are two fully extended arguments under R c , I 1 = fa g and I 2 = f:a g. Note that if we had used R s , we would have had a unique, inconsistent fully extended argument fa ; :a g. Later in this paper, we will use this extensibility function as an example to illustrate how di erent behaviors of default logic may be studied by constrained monotonic inferences under di erent extensibility functions.
Other extensibility functions are possible. For example, an extensibility function stronger than R s is: a rule r is admissible w.r.t. an argument I if r is not blocked by any rule in I frg. That is, it di ers from R s in including r as a rule for blocking. Clearly, this excludes the possibility of admitting r when we have r r. As will be discussed in Section 5, this extensibility function resembles the behavior of Inoue's framework of hypothetical reasoning with logic programs 24], where the semantics of a program is characterized by the maximal sub-programs for which an answer set exists.
From now on, we will say \a priority logic program hP; i under R", to re ect the fact that the rst step in choosing a semantics is to specify how to extend an argument. Given an extensibility function, the semantics of a priority logic program is described by some fully extended arguments. However, there could be di erent interpretations of \fully extended". For this, we rst discuss a property of extensibility functions R. De nition 2.4 An extensibility function R is said to be anti-monotonic if for any sets S 1 and S 2 of rules, S 1 S 2 implies R(S 2 ) R(S 1 ). 2
It is known that if a function f is anti-monotonic, then the function that applies it twice, denoted f 2 , is monotonic. It can be veri ed easily that this applies to the extensibility functions R s and R c de ned above. That is, let R be either R s or R c . Then S 1 S 2 implies R 2 (S 1 ) R 2 (S 2 ). Hence according to the xpoint theory 46], R 2 is guaranteed to have a least xpoint over the domain of subsets of rules, which can be constructed iteratively from the smallest element in the domain, the empty argument.
De nition 2.5 Let = hR; i be any priority program. A xpoint I of R 2 is called an alternating argument of . It is said to be normal (also called self-extensible) if I R(I). Monotonic augmentation of an argument provides an important intuition of argumentation, especially for skeptical reasoning; one should be able to form a unique, conservative skeptical argument to support one's assertion incrementally, starting from the empty argument. This is precisely the same intuition for the well-founded semantics of normal logic programs 49].
The following terminologies are borrowed from the literature on logic programming semantics 19, 49, 55].
De nition 2.6 Let = hR; i be a priority logic program under an extensibility function R.
The well-founded argument of (under R) is the least normal alternating argument. A regular argument of (under R) is a maximal normal alternating argument of . A stable argument I of (under R) is a regular argument of satisfying R(I) = I. 2
The well-founded argument represents a kind of skeptical reasoning based on a constructively establishable sequence of derivations (recall that the least xpoint can be constructed iteratively from the empty argument if the underlying extensibility function is anti-monotonic). Given a program, there could be multiple stable and regular arguments. Thus, a semantics based on these arguments could be used to support one's assertion, credulously, using any of these arguments. The relationship between these semantics have been well studied for the case of normal logic programs (cf. 55]). Consider the extensibility function R s . It is clear that has no stable argument. If I is a stable argument, then 1 cannot be in I since 1 6 2 R s (I). However, if 1 6 2 I then 1 2 R s (I).
On the other hand, has a well-founded argument f4g, and two regular arguments f2;4g and f3;4g. 2 Proposition 2.10 Let be an arbitrary priority logic program under an anti-monotonic extensibility function R. Then, the well-founded argument of exists, and so does at least one regular argument of . 2
The proof of this proposition is straightforward: all we need to show is that the least xpoint of R 2 is necessarily a normal xpoint. This also leads to the existence of a regular argument.
The importance of the well-founded semantics of a priority logic program lies in its tractability for propositional programs (which is also a good indicator of the inherent complexity properties for non-propositional programs with free and bounded variables). Since it is the least xpoint of a monotonic operator, which can be computed iteratively from the empty argument, the well-founded argument can be computed tractably as long as the underlying extensibility function can be computed tractably. For example, we leave it to the reader to verify that when a given (propositional) priority logic program consists of rules over literals, both extensibility functions R s and R c can be computed by a polynomial time algorithm.
Between extensibility and defeasibility of an argument
In this subsection we show that the formal model of argumentation based on extensibility functions may be interpreted more intuitively in terms of attacks and counter-attacks of arguments, at least for some speci c extensibility functions. Here, we show this for the extensibility function R s . First, in the context of priority logic programs there is a natural notion of attack among arguments.
De nition 2.11 Let = hR; i be a priority logic program.
A rule r 2 R is said to be attacked by an argument I if there is a rule r 0 2 I such that r r 0 .
An argument I is said to be attacked by an argument I 0 if there are rules r 2 I and r 0 2 I 0 such that r r 0 .
An argument I is said to be con ict-free if it is not attacked by itself. Otherwise I is said to be con icting. 2 Following 14, 27], we de ne an acceptability operator over arguments I as follows:
A(I) = App(fr : for any argument I 0 that attacks r, I 0 is attacked by Ig):
Intuitively, A(I) accepts those rules whose attackers are all counter-attacked by I.
The following lemma shows that A behaves exactly the same as R 2 s .
Lemma 2.12 Let = hR; i be a priority logic program. For any argument I, we have R 2 s (I) = A(I).
PROOF:
R 2 s (I) A(I). Let r 2 R and assume r 6 2 A(I). We show that r 6 2 R 2 s (I). From r 6 2 A(I), we get two cases on whether r is removed by App (because it is not applicable in A(I)) or not.
Case 1. 9I 0 that attacks r and I 0 is not attacked by I. This implies that for each rule q 2 I 0 there is no rule q 0 2 I such that0 . Thus, by the de nition of R s , we have I 0 R s (I). Since I 0 attacks r, we get that R s (I) attacks r, and therefore r 6 2 R 2 s (I). Case 2. r is not applicable in A(I). r is either never applicable in R or otherwise. In the former case, obviously r 6 2 R 2 s (I). Otherwise, for each chain of inferences that derives Pre(r), there is at least one rule q needed in the chain that is removed due to Case 1.
Since all these q's are not in A(I), we know r cannot possibly be applicable in R 2 s (I). Thus r 6 2 R 2 s (I).
A(I) R 2 s (I). Assume r 6 2 R 2 s (I). Then there exists some r 0 2 R s (I) such that r r 0 . It follows that there exists an argument I 0 R s (I) that attacks r. From I 0 R s (I) we know that I 0 is not attacked by I. That is, I 0 attacks r and I 0 is not attacked by I. Therefore, r 6 2 A(I). 2
With this lemma it is a routine exercise to show the following theorem. Theorem 2.13 Let = hR; i be a priority logic program. Then,
1. An argument I is a regular argument under R s i I is a maximal set such that it is con ict-free and A(I) = I. 2. An argument I is the well-founded argument of under R s i it is the smallest set such that A(I) = I.
3 Representing default by priority
In this section we show that default reasoning is a special case of prioritized argumentation. This is accomplished through a simple transformation from default theories to priority logic programs. We will see that the priority embedded in default logic is very intuitive and uniform. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that a default theory D is a set of defaults. A default is of the form If is a set of formulas fF 1 ; :::; F n g, we use : to denote the set of formulas f:F 1 ; :::; :F n g. hf1:p ; 2: r ; 3: p p; 4:q qg; f1 3; 2 4gi has no stable argument, while its well-founded argument is f2g which is also a regular argument.
A default theory is called a terminological default theory if each of its defaults is of the form that its prerequisite is a conjunction of literals and justi cations and consequent are literals too 3]. These types of default theories are interesting due to their particularly simple and regular form. For these default theories, the translation to a priority program can be even simpler, as shown in the following corollary. The reader can verify that the two stable arguments of the two priority logic programs above imply the same conclusion set. 2 
Variations of default logic
In this subsection, we demonstrate that the behaviors of default logic may be studied through the use of di erent extensibility functions.
As an example, we will be using the extensibility function R c . Since it insists on con- The correspondence between default theories and their translated priority logic programs suggests that the same behavior can be captured directly for default theories. We only need to modify the de nition of R-extension (De nition 3.1) by replacing 
Representing priority by default
Can a priority logic program be represented by a default theory? As we have already seen, priority logic formulated here is parameterized by extensibility functions. This generality allows priority logic to be given a variety of semantics. Since one can argue that default theories can also be given a variety of semantics, any reasonable answer to this question should be based on a particular semantics. In this section, we consider stable arguments under the extensibility function R s , and show that every (propositional) priority logic program can be represented by a default theory. However, we show that this observation fails if the translation is restricted to the same language and required to be modular.
De nition 4.1 (translation) Let = hR; i be a priority logic program under R s . T is transformed to a default theory, D R consists of the defaults translated from program rules by adding an abnormality symbol for each rule. Intuitively, it is used to re ect the control over whether the corresponding rule is applied or nor. D is the set of the defaults corresponding to the given priority constraints. Apparently, the translation here requires to express control knowledge as part of the translated default theory. ab 1 It has only one R-extension Th(f:ab 1 ; flyg) which corresponds to the stable argument above. 2
The translation above is semantics preserving. This is to be established by a theorem below. For the purpose of relating arguments with extensions that may contain extra abnormality atoms, we have the following de nition.
De nition 4.3 Suppose I is an argument of priority logic program = hR; i. We de ne an extended conclusion set set Ext(I) from I by Th(W(I) V (I)) where W(I) = fab l : 9l 0 2 I such that l l 0 g V (I) = fCons(l) : l 2 Ig f:ab l : l 2 I; ab l 6 2 W(I)g: 2 Intuitively, :ab l means that the rule l is not blocked, and ab l indicates that l is blocked by I (independent of whether it is applicable or not). Thus Ext(I) is an extended conclusion set from I that also contains the positive abnormality atoms for the rules that are bloked by I, and negative abnormality atoms for the rules that are in I and not bloked by I.
The following theorem says that the translation preserves all the stable arguments of the given priority program , and conversely, every extension of the translated default theory ( )corresponds to a stable argument of . E i ). To see that I is also stable, rst we note that for every r 2 I, if r l 0 then l 0 6 2 I (as otherwise we would have :ab l 0 2 E, and hence ab l 2 E, leading to a contradiction). Second, we see that for every r 6 2 I, if T "! I j = Pre(r) then there is some l 0 2 I such that r l 0 . This can be seen as follows: since T "! I j = Pre(r), we know there is some E i such that E i j = Pre(r); from r 6 2 I we get ab l 2 E; and it then follows that :ab l 0: abr 2 D such that :ab l 0 2 E. Thus r l 0 . 2 
Modular translation within the same language?
The translation from priority logic to default logic given above is modular but by introducing new symbols | the abnormality propositions. It is natural to ask whether there is a modular translation from a priority logic program to a default theory within the same language. 3 Before answering this question, let's de ne the notion of modular transformation within the same language. The concept of modularity was rst introduced by Imielinski 23] and later used by Gottlob 21] in the study of translation between two di erent formal systems. Here we adopt their de nition for the context of priority logic programs.
De nition 4.5 (modular translation) Suppose L is a propositional language. A translation from priority logic programs on L to default theories on L is said to be modular if satis es the following condition:
For every priority logic program = hR 1 R 2 ; 1 2 i, where 1 R 1 R 1 and 2 R 2 R 2 , we have ( ) = (hR 1 ; 1 i) (hR 2 ; 2 i): 2
Under this de nition of modularity, we raise the following question: Given an arbitrary propositional language L, is there a modular translation from priority logic programs to default theories ( ) within the same language such that for every priority program , I
is a stable argument of under R s i Th(T "! I ) is an R-extension of ( )? The answer to this question is no. Theorem 4.6 For any in nite propositional language L, there is no modular translation from priority logic programs to default theories within L such that I is a stable argument of under R s i Th(T "! I ) is an R-extension of ( ). PROOF:
Assume the underlying in nite language L consists of the following propositional symbols: p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ; :::, plus the standard constants true and false. We assume a modular translation within the same language such that I is a stable argument of a priority logic program under R s i Th(T "! I ) is an R-extension of ( ). We show this leads to a contradiction. With the given language, consider the following in nite priority program: = hR; i = hf1: p 1 ; 2: p 2 p 2 ; :::; n: p n p n ; :::g; f1 n : n = 2; 3; :::gi has only one stable argument fp 1 g under R s . Thus we know ( )'s R-extension must be E = Th(fp 1 g). Since p 1 is implied by E and is within the same language, there must be a default d 2 ( ) such that Cons(d) = p 1 (or any formula in the language of L that is logically equivalent to p 1 ). In addition, by the de nition of R-extension, we know language is not a syntactic problem. In contrast, labels are syntactic entities whose employment is for convenience. In particular, they do not have to be part of our language if we use rules themselves in the place of their labels in specifying a priority relation.
:Just(d) 6 2 E, Pre(d) 6 = p 1 , and since no other proposition symbols p i , i 2, are implied by E, we must have Pre(d) = true. Now for every n 2, consider the priority logic program n = hR fp n g; i. We can see that n has only one stable argument I n = fp n ; p n p n g under R s . Hence ( n ) must have only one R-extension E n = Th(fp n g). Since the translation is modular, we have d 2 ( n ). Clearly, p 1 However, it is known that such kind of formulas cannot be expressed in a propositional language. Therefore a modular translation from the priority logic program doesn't exist.
2
The question remains open as whether there is a modular translation for all nite propositional priority logic programs within the same language.
5 Related Work
Implicit and explicit priority in nonmonotonic reasoning
Priority has been considered important in nonmonotonic reasoning. Ginsberg ( 20] , page 13) points out the need to capture, formally, the notion that one default may be more important than another.
Pearl's system Z 35] partitions a set of normal defaults rules P into disjoint subsets P 0 , ..., P n . A rule a:b b is in P i (i = 0; :::; n) if fag P ? i?1 S j=0 P j is not inconsistent. Then the ranking of rules obtained this way is used to rank models according to the highest rank of a rule that they violate. So priority here is used to serve model selection.
Certain forms of priority have been used as building blocks in formulating the semantics of some nonmonotonic logics. A well-known example is that of Shoham 45] where the underlying priority (called partial preorder) plays the role of selecting models. Obviously, priority logic di ers from these type of approaches by treating priority as a programming construct rather than the one built into the semantics.
Allen Brown et al. 2, 1] (also see 22]) propose a family of modal logics of preference where preference is used in selecting models. By introducing the preference, they argue that the resulting theory turns out to be surprisingly general and powerful. In general, the preference logic there is based on two modal operators, P f and P b where P f F means that F su ces for preference and P b F means that F precludes such a preference relation 1]. To our knowledge, this is the rst framework allowing preference operator to appear in a logic framework.
Marek and Truszczynski (cf. 33], Chapter 3) show that Reiter's extension can be captured by a well-ordering over defaults. A well-ordering of this kind speci es which defaults should be performed before which others. This is a useful priority constraint, but it is di erent from ours where the notion of priority constraint means that a rule's application automatically blocks lower ranked rules.
The work by Baader and Hollunder 3], Brewka 6] , and Delgrande and Schaub 11] can be considered as an extension of Marek and Truszczynski's work in attempting to answer the following question: Given a preference relation and a default theory, what if a default extension violates the speci ed sequence of default applications. Our notion of priority is that of defeasibility; i.e., the application of a rule automatically blocks all the lower ranked rules from being applied. To illustrate the di erence between this notion of priority with the one in the work in 3, 6, 11], consider the following simple example:
Suppose we have the following fact and defaults:
drive _ take bus; d 1 : : :broken drive ; d 2 : : bad weather take bus This speci cation may be considered incomplete as there is no preference over whether to drive or to take a bus. The preference of driving over taking a bus may be speci ed by adding :drive as a justi cation in d 2 , or by specifying a priority d 2 d 1 in priority logic. In systems like those in 3, 6, 11], this priority would have no e ect on semantics, i.e., exactly the same, original extension is retained. This is because concluding both drive and take bus would not violate the notion of preference intended in their systems.
It is interesting to note that a notion of priority, very similar to the one used in this paper, has been studied in a quite di erent context, active databases, by Jagadish et al. 25] . They analyze various types of interactions between rules in active databases and nd that application-of-a-rule-blocking-other-rules is one of the most basic interactions between rules of active databases.
Explicit priority in logic programming
The concept of logic programming without default negation was rst suggested in 27] and further developed in 13]. The authors argue that a knowledge representation language without using default negation can avoid the possible confusions arising from the use of default and explicit negation. First, their work is restricted to logic programs (i.e. rules consisting of literals), and thus it is impossible to answer the question of whether nonmonotonic reasoning in general can be viewed as monotonic inferences with priority. Secondly, priority in their framework relies on the existence of contradiction. That is, if there is no contradiction, the speci ed priority is ine ective. This di ers from the priority studied in this paper. The e ect of the interaction between priority and contradiction is usually not easy to predict. As a result, the semantics under this notion of priority may not be intuitive to what is intended. More details can be found in 51]).
In 43] Sakama and Inoue propose prioritized logic programming, where priorities can be explicitly speci ed in a program. Priority here is among literals and the purpose is to reduce the number of answer sets in disjunctive logic programming.
Order logic programs proposed by Buccafurri et al. 9 ] provides a mechanism for constructing a set of components organized into an inheritance hierarchy. Each component consists of a set of rules which may have logical negative heads. Like in the object-oriented approach, properties de ned for the higher components in the hierarchy ow down to the lower ones. When a contradiction arises, a conclusion from the lower rules is considered a re nement of the conclusion from the higher rules. Thus in this framework priority is achieved automatically by the program structure.
Argumentation based formalisms
Logic systems based on a notion of an argument have been studied extensively in the past. Pollock 36] seems to be the rst to use the concept of an argument as a tool to analyze defeasible reasoning. Around the same time, argument-based reasoning was applied in legal reasoning (e.g., 38, 39, 44, 28] ) as well as in nonmonotonic reasoning 30]. Dung's work on argumentation and acceptability of arguments 16] provides a much deep understanding of negation-as-failure in terms of arguments. He shows that argumentation provides a uni ed framework for nonmonotonic reasoning and logic programming with default as well as explicit negation. Kakas et al. 27] further extend some of these results to formulate a theory of the acceptability of arguments. Argumentation semantics of logic programs have been related to the semantics formalized in other logics. In particular, it has been shown that many semantics for normal logic programs are in fact equivalent 8, 55] . For a comprehensive development of the argumentation framework, see 5] .
In the argumentation framework, either by Dung or by Kakas et al., an argument is a set of default assumptions. This concept has a major di erence with priorities over inference rules. There are programs which cannot be distinguished by any argumentation semantics but may be considered essentially di erent under a priority semantics. Consider two programs with default negation, P 1 = fp q; q notqg and P 2 = fp notq; q notqg.
Under any argumentation semantics, these two programs are considered semantically equivalent. However, these two programs have di erent semantics in Inoue's framework of hypothetical reasoning with logic programs 24], where the semantics of a program is characterized by the maximal sub-programs for which an answer set exists. Using our framework it it possible to distinguish the semantics of the above two programs according to Inoue. Simply, we can translate these programs into two priority logic programs: P 0 1 = hf1: p q; 2: q g;f2 2giand P 0 2 = hf1: p ; 2: q g;f1 2; 2 2gi.
One can verify that under a stronger extensibility function R str (I) = App(fr 2 P : for every r 0 2 I frg; r 6 r 0 g) the unique stable argument of P 0 1 is ;, and the unique stable argument of P 0 2 is f1g. Hence under the extensibility function R str , the two programs have di erent semantics. These semantics coincide with that of Inoue's.
Argumentation has recently gained some popularity in formalizing legal reasoning. This approach has been in uenced by the argumentation semantics of logic programs. Kowalski and Toni 28] explore the role of argumentation in practical legal reasoning, and formalize the admissibility semantics based on a notion of rebuttal attacks. Prakken and Sartor 39] propose a logic programming system with default as well as strong negation that allows priorities on program rules. Unlike the notion of priority used in this paper, the priorities in this system are themselves defeasibly derived as the consequences of the given program. The main di erence of these work with priority logic presented in this paper is that in the language of priority logic there is no construct for default negation.
Final Remarks
Priority logic proposed in this paper is capable of capturing general nonmonotonic reasoning in a uniform matter without using defaults or negation as failure constructs. This has been demonstrated by a simple translation of default theories into priority logic programs. In a separate paper 50], it is also shown that circumscription can be captured by priority logic. More recently in 54], we have shown how disjunctive logic programming based on stable models can also be understood as selecting monotonic inferences in the sense of this paper. These results suggest that the essential mechanism in various nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms is the construction of derivations compatible with a simple priority relation among program rules.
The priority relation used in this paper is static. That is priorities are prede ned over the knowledge (rule) base. An interesting extension is to make the priority relation dynamic, as was done in 7, 39] . Roughly, we can have meta-rules of the form l : l 0 l 00 1 ; :::; n which states that when the conditions 1 , ..., and n are true, l 0 l 00 . Considering that the meta-rule can also be prioritized, the nal framework should be much more powerful.
We now comment on the issues related to proof theories of priority logic. On the one hand, since priority logic is based on monotonic inferences guided by priorities, there is always a naive, ine ective procedure for propositional priority logic programs, based on exhaustive search and comparison using the underlying extensibility function. On the other hand, since priority logic is such a powerful knowledge representation language, as it can be used to represent default reasoning and common sense reasoning by circumscription, disjunctive logic programming, the fact that these knowledge representation languages do not have general, e ective proof procedures implies that the same is true for prioritized argumentation. However, it is possible to develop realistic proof procedures for special classes of priority theories. In fact, many such procedures exist. Since normal logic programs are a special class of priority logic programs, the elegant proof procedure by Eshghi and Kowalski for abductive reasoning 17] (also see 31, 47] ), and the various e cient proof procedures for the well-founded semantics, can be adopted for the corresponding class of priority logic programs (under the corresponding semantics). Since default theories are a class of priority logic programs, Reiter's backward chaining procedure to prove theorems of default theories with normal defaults can be adopted for the corresponding class of priority logic programs. Extending these proof procedures to accommodate some larger classes of priority theories require further investigation. In fact, viewing nonmonotonic reasoning as constrained monotonic inferences points to a new direction for investigating proof theoretic properties of nonmonotonic reasoning.
